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On Jan. 10, the office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) announced that it would not impose
economic sanctions against Costa Rica and Colombia in a trade dispute involving bananas. In return
for the US decision to drop the threat of sanctions, those two countries agreed to support the USTR's
efforts to convince the World Trade Organization (WTO) to legally force the European Union (EU) to
revoke its unilateral restrictions on banana imports from Latin America.
In late 1994, the USTR opened an investigation of Costa Rica and Colombia under section 301 of
the US Trade Act, which requires the US to retaliate if unfair trade practices are found to injure
US businesses. The investigation was launched at the behest of Chiquita Brands International, a
major US food producer that distributes bananas grown in Latin America. According to Chiquita, a
decision by the Costa Rican and Colombian governments in late 1994 to accept EU regulations that
unilaterally impose quotas on banana imports from Latin America adversely affected Chiquita's
operations in the region. Under the quota system, Latin American banana exporters are allowed to
ship up to 2.2 million metric tons of the fruit to EU member nations at a preferential tariff rate of
20%, or US$123.60 per MT.
Beyond the maximum tonnage, however, the duty leaps to US$1,050.60 per MT. The quotas,
established in mid-1993, are aimed at reserving a share of the European banana market for
producers in former European colonies in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific region (ACP),
which have been unable to compete effectively with Latin American producers and some other
exporting countries outside the ACP region (see NotiSur, 01/28/93, 02/18/93, 03/05/93, and 07/08/93).
All the banana exporting countries in Latin America have criticized the quotas as an unfair trade
practice that penalizes non-ACP producers and breaches the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT). Indeed, the regional producers were selling more than 2.6 million MT of the fruit on
EU markets before the quotas took effect, and the combined annual shipment of Latin American
bananas to Europe would have surpassed 3 million MT by 1994 had the quotas not been imposed.
Nevertheless, four of the regional exporting nations Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, and
Nicaragua reached an agreement with the EU in 1994 to accept the quotas and desist from direct
efforts to roll back the restrictions through the WTO. In return, the EU agreed to reserve about half
of the 2.2 million import quota assigned to Latin America for those four nations, thus assuring them
each an individual percentage of the lucrative European market while eliminating the difficulties
caused by having to compete with each other. Chiquita Brands, however, has bitterly protested the
settlement because the EU accord with Costa Rica and Colombia includes a clause that allows the
governments of those two countries to manage 70% of the import licenses for bananas that the EU
grants to those nations annually, leaving only 30% of the licenses in the hands of such multinationals
as Chiquita.
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Previously, Chiquita and other foreign companies managed the majority of EU import licenses for
bananas that were granted to Costa Rica and Colombia, and thus the multinationals enjoyed an
advantage when contracting to buy bananas from domestic Latin American producers for export
to Europe since they could freely set the wholesale prices. As a result of the EU agreement with
Costa Rica and Colombia, Chiquita has lost its control over banana exports in those countries.
Consequently, Chiquita has been forced to pay much higher prices for bananas to domestic
producers, while at the same time reducing the amount of bananas it can export from its own
plantations in Costa Rica and Colombia since it must now compete with the domestic producers for
export licenses from the government (see NotiSur, 06/08/95 and 11/02/95).
Notwithstanding the USTR decision to open an investigation, from the start many observers in the
US believed it was unlikely that the US would impose retaliatory sanctions against Costa Rica and
Colombia. For one thing, the other two US companies that export bananas to the EU Del Monte
Foods and the Dole Food Company did not support Chiquita's request for sanctions because they
found alternative ways around Europe's restrictive rules by investing in companies in the Caribbean
that benefit from the EU quota system. Chiquita was slower to move in preparation for the quotas.
As a result, that company suffered much more than the other two US firms and it was thus forced to
turn on its own to the USTR to stem the damage. For another thing, Chiquita's demand carried little
weight because the EU quotas have only a minimal impact on jobs held by US citizens given that
very few bananas are grown in the US. In general, the USTR very rarely advocates trade retaliation
to protect US investors abroad if there are not sufficient domestic consequences involved.
Indeed, the New York Times reported in December that the USTR has been unable to find adequate
justification for trade sanctions against Costa Rica and Colombia in the banana dispute. "Even the
US Trade Representative, Mickey Kantor, who has a pretty subtle understanding of how political
and trade interests merge, had to pause for a minute when he was asked at a news conference
the other day to identify any American economic interests at stake in what many Latin American
nations now call the banana war," read a Dec. 5 article in the New York Times. According to the
paper, Kantor shrugged off the question with a joke. With a broad smile, he said, "If you drive north
on the Pacific Coast Highway, between Santa Barbara and Los Angeles, I think there's 10 acres of
bananas on the right-hand side."
Perhaps most important, all Latin American diplomats and even most US officials agree that the
real culprit in the banana war is the EU for having imposed the import quotas in the first place,
forcing countries like Costa Rica and Colombia to come to terms with the EU even though they
adamantly oppose the quotas as an unfair trade practice. "There is no basis for Chiquita to demand
trade sanctions," said Simon Faraco, Venezuela's director of trade negotiations, in defense of Costa
Rica and Colombia. "Those of us who signed the accord with the EU were forced to choose between
the lesser of two evils. The goal of the Latin American countries has always been to roll back the
quotas and open the European markets to our bananas. The quotas are discriminatory, but we didn't
impose the system."
This argument apparently carried the most weight in the USTR's decision in early January to
suspend its investigation. In announcing the ruling, the USTR reported that both the Costa Rican
and Colombian governments have agreed to support the US in its effort to seek WTO intervention
to force the EU to revoke its quotas. Nevertheless, neither country has been asked to revoke its
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agreement with the EU or to join the US as plaintiffs in the case before the WTO. Both governments
did, however, agree to abide by whatever ruling comes out of the WTO regarding the US petition,
which was formally submitted to the WTO by President Bill Clinton's administration in Sept. 1995.
"The US, Costa Rica, and Colombia share the objective of achieving greater market access to the
European Union for Latin American bananas," read a joint declaration signed by the three nations,
which the US demanded in return for discarding trade sanctions.
For the most part, the USTR resolution to discard sanctions comes as no surprise since the decision
to open an investigation was generally regarded as a political move by Washington bureaucrats
rather than a technical measure to retaliate against unfair trade practices. Indeed, in November 1995
the Journal of Commerce reported that the USTR had originally agreed to consider Chiquita's case
against Costa Rica and Colombia as part of a deal struck in late 1994 between Mickey Kantor and
Senate majority leader Bob Dole (R- Kansas). Under that accord, Dole allegedly agreed to help the
Clinton administration win congressional approval for the Uruguay Round negotiations of GATT. In
turn, Dole would be able to placate the owner of Chiquita Brands, Carl Lindner, a major contributor
to Dole's presidential campaign.
Dole, considered the most likely candidate to win the Republican nomination this year, has received
at least US$140,000 in direct campaign contributions from Lindner, and Dole has been flying around
to campaign appearances since last year in planes owned by the Lindner family's many corporate
interests. Dole introduced two bills in Congress in late 1995 to apply trade sanctions against Costa
Rica and Colombia. The bills failed to gain the needed backing, but Dole did win support from
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich, other influential Republicans in Congress, and even some
important Democrats. According to the New York Times, Chiquita's ability to win such broad
backing reflects Lindner's generosity with politicians across the board in recent years, with both
Democrats and Republicans alike indebted to the Lindner family.
While estimates vary, groups that track campaign donations agree that the Lindners, other
companies controlled by the Lindner family, and other senior executives of those companies gave
roughly US$1 million to Democrats and Republicans in the last two years, mostly in "soft money" to
political action committees. "Sen. Bob Dole really didn't want to sanction Costa Rica and regrets his
efforts to do so," Curtin Winsor, one of Dole's top foreign policy advisors, told the Costa Rican press
in late January. "I don't think Bob Dole would have taken the same position if he had known the
poison it would create in unfavorable US press reports. It is not uncommon, however, that a senator
would be mindful of a major contributor. This is the nature of US politics. It wasn't a vendetta
against Costa Rica." [Sources: Agencia Centroamericana de Noticias- Spanish news service EFE,
10/30/95; Inforpress Centroamericana (Guatemala), 11/02/95; Notimex, 11/13/95; Diario Estrategia
(Chile), 12/12/95; Journal of Commerce, 11/17/95, 11/28/95, 12/07/95, 12/14/95; Reuter, 01/05/96; Inter
Press Service, 10/30/95, 10/31/95, 12/09/95, 01/05/96, 01/10/96, 01/11/96; New York Times, 12/05/95,
01/11/96; Deutche Press Agentur, 01/11/96; El Pais (Colombia), 01/11/96, 01/12/96; Agence FrancePresse, 11/21/95, 11/28/95, 12/11/95, 12/12/95, 12/16/95, 12/20/95, 12/25-27/95, 01/10/96, 01/18/96; Tico
Times (Costa Rica), 01/19/96]
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